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Forcing the Heir to Share: The Effect of
Cash Inheritance on Child Support
Obligations
I. Introduction
"The duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose
of child support is to promote the child's best interests."' While this
purpose is easily stated, the practical considerations of how to
calculate a child support obligation have long occupied legislatures
and courts. Recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court grappled
with the issue of whether an obligor's cash inheritance is "income"
within the definition of Pennsylvania's child support statute, 23 Pa.
C.S.A. § 4302.2
William DeRoss received a cash inheritance upon the death of
his mother. In determining the effect of the inheritance on
DeRoss's child support obligation, the trial court treated the body
of the inheritance as income and simply divided it out over the
remaining time until the child's eighteenth birthday.4  The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in affirming the trial court's decision,
looked at the definition of income in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 and held
that cash inheritance was included in the phrase "other entitlements
to money or lump sum awards, without regard to source, including
lottery winnings. '
This comment contends that the Pennsylvania Superior Court
erred in finding cash inheritances as income within the meaning of
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302. The court's decision automatically increased
the child support obligation without regard to the needs of the child
and the ability of the obligor to pay. This comment suggests that
the more appropriate way to factor in a lump-sum cash inheritance
1. Humphreys v. DeRoss, 737 A.2d 775, 777 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc),
allocatur granted, 729 A.2d 371 (Pa. 2000) (citing Depp v. Holland, 636 A.2d 204,
206 (Pa. Super. 1994)).
2. See id. at 775.
3. Id. at 776.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 779.
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is through the child support guideline deviation procedure provided
for in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-5.6 Rule
1910.16-5 lists several items for the trier of fact to consider in
deciding whether to deviate from the guideline amount, including
the assets of the parties.7
This comment will examine the case of Humphreys v. DeRoss,
how it was analyzed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, and how
courts of other jurisdictions have treated the issue of cash
inheritance and child support obligations. Part II will present the
history of the Humphreys case and the analyses by the Superior
Court. Part III will analyze the development of 23 Pa. C.S.A. §
4302's definition of income, the treatment of inheritance in other
jurisdictions, overriding policy concerns inherent in the Superior
Court's decision, and the role of Pennsylvania's deviation
procedure. Finally, part IV concludes that cash inheritances should
not automatically be considered as income, and that Pennsylvania
should utilize the deviation procedure expressly provided by the
legislature for this purpose.
II. Background
William DeRoss inherited $83,696.65 from the sale of his
mother's residence upon her death in August 1994 as the sole
beneficiary of her estate.8 DeRoss was paying child support for his
daughter, Angela, who lived with her adult sister, Beth
Humphreys. 9 Upon Humphreys's petition for modification of
Angela's support order, the trial court amortized all of DeRoss's
inheritance over the remaining period between the date of the
modification petition until Angela's eighteenth birthday.10
DeRoss's monthly disposable income was just over $1000.1'
DeRoss used the $83,696.65 cash inheritance from his mother's
estate to purchase a new home for himself and his new family, thus
he was not earning any income from the inheritance.12 The hearing
officer imputed to DeRoss an additional $4,525.00 a month in
income, arriving at a monthly support obligation of $607.45-more
than two-thirds of DeRoss's actual monthly income.13
6. 231 PA. CODE § 1910.16-5 (2001).
7. Id.
8. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 776.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 784-85.
12. Id. at 775.
13. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 775-76, 784.
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court's majority opinion looked at
the statutory definition of income contained in the child support
statute, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302, and determined that cash inheritance
was included in the phrase "other entitlements to money or lump
sum awards, without regard to source, including lottery winnings."
1 4
The majority then referred to other jurisdictions that held cash
inheritance as income, as well as several jurisdictions that had come
to the opposite conclusion." Analogizing the lump-sum cash
inheritance to a "windfall" such as that received in a lottery, the
majority concluded that the trial court properly included DeRoss's
inheritance in calculating the child support obligation.16
Two concurring opinions were filed in this case.17 The first,
written by President Judge McEwen, briefly stated that although he
was unable to find abuse of discretion by the trial court in this case,
the dissenting opinion illuminated problems caused by such lump-
sum receipts. 8 Judge McEwen suggested the need for a formula
from the Legislature or the Supreme Court to more fairly and
uniformly adjust actual incomes to reflect unusual income receipts. 9
The other concurring opinion, written by Judge Joyce, based the
inclusion of cash inheritance as income on another phrase in the
statutory definition, "any form of payment due to and collectible by
an individual regardless of source."20
The dissenting opinion by Judge Eakin offered two alternatives
to treating the entire cash inheritance as income.2" First, the court
may include the actual or imputed income generated by the cash
inheritance to the income used for calculating the initial order.22
Second, the court may calculate the amount of support without
considering the cash inheritance, then allow a suitable deviation
thereafter based on the inheritance.23 This casenote will focus on
the second alternative offered by the dissenting opinion.
14. Id. at 779.
15. See id. at 779-80.
16. Id. at 780.
17. See id. at 781-84.
18. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 784.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 783.
21. See id. at 784.
22. Id.




A. Definition of Income
Pennsylvania's statutory definition of income for child support
calculation purposes is contained in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302:
"Income." Includes compensation for services, including, but
not limited to, wages, salaries, bonuses, fees, compensation in
kind, commissions and similar items; 'income derived from
business; gains derived from dealings in property; interest; rents;
royalties; dividends; annuities; income from life insurance and
endowment contracts; all forms of retirement; pensions; income
from discharge of indebtedness; distributive share of partnership
gross income; income in respect of a decedent; income from an
interest in an estate or trust; military retirement benefits;
railroad employment retirement benefits; social security
benefits; temporary and permanent disability benefits; workers'
compensation; unemployment compensation; other entitlements
to money or lump sum awards, without regard to source,
including lottery winnings; income tax refunds; insurance
compensation or settlements; awards or verdicts; and any form
of payment due to and collectible by an individual regardless of
24
source.
The phrase of the statute relied on by the Humphreys majority,
"other entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without regard
to source, including lottery winnings," was added in two separate
amendments." The first amendment, in 1996, added the phrase
"other entitlements to money or lump sum awards, without regard
to source."26 The second amendment was added in 1997 following
Darby v. Darby, in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that the statutory definition of income was not all inclusive, and a
lump sum tort settlement was inclusive as income.27  The
Pennsylvania legislature then amended 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 4302 to
include "bonuses; lottery winnings; income tax refunds; insurance
compensation or settlements; awards or verdicts; and any form of
24. 23 PA. CONS. STAT, ANN. § 4302 (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
Emphasized phrases indicate those discussed by the majority and concurring
opinions in Humphreys v. DeRoss.
25. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 779, 781-82.
26. Act of October 16, 1996, P.L. 706, No. 124, § 3.
27. See Darby v. Darby, 686 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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payment due to and collectible by an individual regardless of
source."
28
Lump sum cash inheritances do not fit into any of the
categories listed under the statutory definition of income found in
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302. The majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions in Humphreys looked at four of the categories: (1) income
from an interest in an estate or trust; (2) gains derived from
dealings in property; (3) other entitlements to money or lump sum
awards, without regard to source, including lottery winnings; and
(4) any form of payment due to and collectible by an individual
regardless of source.29
The majority opinion concluded that the first category did not
apply to DeRoss's cash inheritance because "income from an
interest in an estate or trust" refers only to income generated by the
inheritance, not the body of the inheritance itself? Because
DeRoss reinvested his inheritance in a residence, it does not
generate earnings and therefore DeRoss has no income from his
interest in the estate.31 The majority also discounted the second
category, "gains derived from dealings in property," because there
was no evidence in the record to support the assertion that DeRoss
realized a gain by using the cash inheritance to purchase a larger
home for himself and his new family.32
The majority relied on the third category, "other entitlements
to money or lump sum awards, without regard to source, including
lottery winnings," in reaching its conclusion.3 A cash inheritance,
however, is clearly distinguishable from this category. First, an
inheritance is not an "award," but rather a gift from someone,
usually a family member, to a specific person.34 Second, an
inheritance is not based on chance, like the lottery, but rather is
intended for the recipient alone. 5
In analyzing the remaining portion of the category, "other
entitlements to money," the dissenting opinion suggested that the
phrase is a "catchall" that is intended to prevent an inventive
obligor from calling his income something else in order to avoid
paying support 6  The dissent further asserted that a cash
28. Act of December 16,1997, P.L. 549, No. 58, § 1.1.
29. See Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 778-83.
30. Id. at 778.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 778-79.
33. Id. at 779.
34. See Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 785, FN 8.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 785.
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inheritance is not an "obscure" concept, but rather common and
unambiguous.s7 Had the legislature meant to include inheritance in
the definition of income, the dissent reasoned, it would have done
so outright and not relied on such a broad catchall phrase.38
Because the legislature did not expressly include inheritance, the
dissent concluded that the intention must have been to exclude it.39
Cash inheritance also does not fall within the phrase "other
entitlements to money" because a person is not "entitled" to an
inheritance. An entitlement is defined as "right to benefits, income
or property which may not be abridged without due process., 40 In
the United States, an heir can be disinherited through a will, and
therefore has no right to an inheritance at all.'
Joyce's concurring opinion relies on the fourth category, "any
form of payment due to and collectible by an individual regardless
of source., 42 However, an heir is not "paid" by an estate-it is not
compensation, and is not a discharge of any debt.4' Also, as
previously mentioned, an heir is not "due" an inheritance.'
B. Treatment By Other Jurisdictions
In attempting to fit inheritance into the statutory definition of
income, the majority opinion turned to the decisions of five other
jurisdictions on this issue.45 However, upon further analysis, the
cases relied on by the majority actually do not support the inclusion
of inheritance as income.
The majority first cited Crayton v. Crayton, an Alaska case
which held that a one-time gift (not an inheritance) from the
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 785.
40. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 368 (abr. 6th ed. 1997).
41. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b)(1990).
A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an
individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by
intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that class survives
the decedent, the share of the decedent's intestate estate to which that
individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual or
each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her] intestate share.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b)(1990). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY, WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.7 (1999) ("A decedent's
will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to
property of the decedent passing by intestate succession.")
42. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 783.
43. Id. at 785, n.10.
44. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, supra note 41; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY, supra note 41.
45. See Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 779-80.
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payor's father was includable as income. 46 However, the Crayton
case held that the gift could be included as income only because the
court was dealing with a past payment, not indeterminate future
payments. In fact, the Crayton court specifically stated that a trial
court should not consider gifts when determining income for
purposes of calculating a future child support obligation because it
would unfairly inflate the obligation.
The majority next relied on Goldberg v. Goldberg, a Louisiana
case that concerned an alimony award, which is completely
different from child support calculations and therefore not useful
41for comparison purposes.
Ford v. Ford is also unhelpful to the majority's position." In
this case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that money received
by inheritance can be considered income when it is regularly
distributed (which would be equal to Pennsylvania's "income from
an interest in an estate or trust"), but a one-time distribution from a
life insurance trust is not considered income. 1
In Forsythe v. Forsythe, a Virginia case, inheritance was
equated with "gift," a term specifically included as income in
Virginia's statute.12  "Gift" is not included in Pennsylvania's
46. Id. at 779 (citing Crayton v. Crayton, 944 P.2d 487,490 (Alaska 1997)).
47. Crayton v. Crayton, 944 P.2d 487, 490 (Alaska 1994). In Crayton, the
father was requesting reimbursement for the expenditures he made supporting the
two children during the time they lived with him before primary physical custody
was transferred to the mother. Id. at 489. The court stated that because the
superior court will determine the mother's income only in retrospect when the
children lived with their father, it was fair for the court to base the amount of
reimbursement on the actual resources available to the mother during that period.
Id. at 490.
48. Id. (citing Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412, 415-16 (Alaska 1995)).
49. See Goldberg v. Goldberg, 698 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997).
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "the primary purpose of alimony is
to provide one spouse with sufficient income to obtain the necessities of life."
Zullo v. Zullo, 613 A.2d 544, 545 (Pa. 1992) (citing Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15
(Pa. 1986)). "It is not intended as a weapon to punish a spouse but rather is an
attempt to provide financial assistance to rehabilitate rather than reimbursing a
spouse." Id. Whereas the purpose of child support, as mentioned previously, is
"to promote the child's best interests." Depp v. Holland, 636 A.2d 204, 206 (Pa.
Super. 1994).
50. See Ford v. Ford, No. 01A01-9611-CV-00536, 1998 Tenn App. LEXIS 703,
at *11-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1998).
51. Id.
52. Forsythe v. Forsythe, 41 Va. Cir. 82, 85 (Cir. Ct. of Fairfax County, Va.
1996); accord Goldhamer v. Cohen, 525 S.E.2d 599 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). While
Forsythe was a spousal support case, under the settlement agreement the parties
chose to define gross income for spousal support purposes in terms of the gross
income definition contained in Virginia's child support statute, section 20-108.2(C)
of the 1950 Code of Virginia. Forsythe, 41 Va. Cir. at 84. According to the court,
2001]
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statutory definition of income, thus Forsythe is inapplicable to this
situation.
Finally, the majority compares the case before it with Bryant v.
Bryant, a New York case that uses inheritance in a deviation
procedure (calculation of additional child support), but not in the
original calculation of the child support obligation. 3 The Bryant
court quotes the Family Court Act § 413 (1)(e), which provides:
[w]here a parent is or may be entitled to receive non-recurring
payments from extraordinary sources not otherwise considered
as income pursuant to this section, including but not limited
to... [g]ifts and inheritances.., the court... may allocate a
proportion of the same to child support, and such amount shall
be paid in a manner determined by the court.
54
The court then proceeds to qualify this statute, pointing out the
precautions a court must take in making such an award.5 In fact,
the Bryant court stated that the "mere fact that [the payor]
inherited a sizeable sum of money does not, standing alone, provide
an adequate basis for such an award [of additional child support]. 56
Rather, the court must take into consideration a number of relevant
factors, including, inter alia, the parties' respective standards of
section 20-108.2(C) provides that:
"Gross income" shall mean all income from all sources and shall include,
but not be limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties,
bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interests, trust income,
annuities, capital gains, social security benefits except as listed below,
workers' compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits,
disability insurance benefits, veterans' benefits, spousal support, rental
income, gifts, prizes or awards ....
Id. But cf Gardner v. Yrttima, No. 41A01-0008-JV-282, 2001 Ind. App. LEXIS
202, at *10-16 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2001). While the Indiana Court of Appeals
equated an inheritance with "gift," which is specifically included in gross income
under Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1), it concluded that a court may
exclude inheritance from its determination of gross income where sound reasons
exist. Id. at *11-12, 15. In addition, if the court excludes an inheritance from gross
income, it may nevertheless consider the effect of the inheritance on the financial
circumstances and net worth of the parent in determining whether to deviate from
the Guidelines in determining child support. Id. at *14-16.
53. Bryant v. Bryant, 235 A.D.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). The court
remitted the case to the Family Court after finding that the actual amount awarded
as additional child support was inappropriate as it represented a significant portion
of the obligor's inheritance, and the decision to provide for a lump-sum
distribution necessary required the obligor to liquidate substantial assets. Id. at
120-21.
54. Id. at 119.
55. See id. at 119, 123.
56. Id. at 123, n.5.
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living and the actual needs of the children.57 The court should also
give careful thought to the impact the award would have on the
payor and whether the award could be fashioned in such a way as to
avoid invading the principal."
None of these cases actually support the majority's position of
treating the entire body of a cash inhertiance as income for child
support calculation purposes. In fact, the two cases dealing directly
with inheritance, Ford and Bryant, actually seem to support the two
alternatives advocated by the dissent in holding that inheritance
should not be included as income in calculating a child support
obligation. 9 The Bryant court used the same option advocated by
Eakin in the Humphreys dissenting opinion, to take the inheritance
into account during a deviation procedure after the original support
order has been established, and even voiced some of the same
concerns raised by the dissent.'
Decisions in other jurisdictions also support the two
alternatives offered by the Eakin dissent. These alternatives are
either to include real or imputed income generated by the cash
inheritance in calculating the original order, or to allow a suitable
deviation from the original support order based on the
inheritance.61
Several courts have held that only real income from an
inheritance is considered in calculating a child support order.62 In
Gainey v. Gainey, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that,
like the Pennsylvania statute, the Washington child support statute
did not include "gifts," but did include "interest., 63 Accordingly,
the court concluded that because an inheritance was essentially a
testamentary gift, the corpus of an inheritance is not included in a
parent's gross income, but that the interest generated by an
inheritance is.'
57. Id.
58. Bryant at 123.
59. See Ford, 1998 Tenn App. LEXIS 703, at *11-13; Bryant, 235 A.D.2d at
117.
60. See Bryant, 235 A.D.2d at 119-23.
61. Humphreys v. DeRoss, 737 A.2d 775, 784 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc),
allocatur granted, 729 A.2d 37 (Pa. 2000).
62. See Stula v. Stula, No. FA 940544358S, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2132, at
*2 (Conn. Super. July 21, 1998); Helgeson v. Helgeson, 528 N.W.2d 91, at *14 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994); Reech v. Reech, No. 70241, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 318, at *13
(Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1997); Gainey v. Gainey, 948 P.2d 865, 869 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1997).




Two courts have held that income may be imputed to the
inheritance. In In re Marriage of Armstrong, the Colorado Court
of Appeals held that the amount of income that the obligor's one-
time inheritance could reasonably be expected to generate was
properly included as income for purposes of calculating child
support.6 Similarly, the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Halter v.
Halter held that while inheritance was not income within the
meaning of the child support guidelines, any earnings that might
have been generated from the inheritance could have been
considered in the support calculation.67
In addition to the Bryant case cited by the majority, one other
court has held that an obligor's inheritance should be considered in
a deviation procedure after the original child support obligation has
been calculated.68 In Connell v. Connell, the court held that child
support should first be calculated utilizing the gross income of the
parties as defined in the guidelines. 69  Then the court should
undertake an analysis of the factors contained in the child support
statute, considering the inheritance, to determine an amount to
supplement the guidelines award." The court noted that one of the
benefits of this approach is that it "permits the court to reasonably
consider the existence of the inheritance, its current form, as well as
all the circumstances bearing on the best interests of the children.
71
65. See In re Marriage of Armstrong, 831 P.2d 501, 503 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992);
Halter v. Halter, 959 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998).
66. Armstrong, 831 P.2d at 503.
67. Halter, 959 S.W.2d at 762.
68. See Connell v. Connell, 712 A.2d 1266, 1269-70 (N.J. Super. 1998).
69. Id. at 1269.
70. Id. at 1270. The factors listed in New Jersey's child support statute
include:
(1) Needs of the child;
(2) Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;
(3) All sources of income and assets of each parent;
(4) Earning ability of each parent, including educational background,
training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for
children including the cost of providing child care and the length of time
and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate
employment;
(5) Need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education;
(6) Age and health of the child and each parent;
(7) Income, assets and earning ability of the child;
(8) Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;
(9) Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; and
(10) Any other factors the court may deem relevant.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23a (West 2000).
71. Id.
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One recent case dealing with this issue of inheritance and
modification of a child support obligation touched on all three
alternatives-inclusion of actual income, imputed income, or use of
a deviation procedure . In Kern v. Castle, the court looked to its
own statute, as well as sister-state authority, and concluded that (1)
one time gifts or inheritances are not income; (2) interest actually
earned from gifts or inheritances is income; and (3) imputation of
income based on the inheritance corpus may be considered in the
court's discretion.73 The applicable California statute also provided
for a deviation procedure that allowed the court to consider
reduction in living expenses and other relevant facts at the courts
discretion.74
The California Court of Appeal pointed to public policy
considerations in its statutes which required that children share in
the standard of living of both parents, and that the support award is
consistent with the child's best interests.75 The court then remanded
the case because although the trial court did not err by concluding
the lump-sum inheritance was not income but interest earned from
the inheritance was, the trial court failed to provide reasonable
justification why it was in the child's best interests for the court to
not use its discretion in imputing interest income to the inheritance
or taking the reduction of living expenses into account."
In reviewing all of the court decisions of other jurisdictions on
the issue of inheritance and child support, none of them have
treated the body of the inheritance as income, as the Humphreys
majority did. The majority of the courts have either included real
or imputed income from the inheritance, or have considered the
inheritance during deviation procedures, both positions advocated
by the dissent. Those that have not treated inheritance this way
72. See Kern v. Castle, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
73. Id. at 882. The Kern court referred to California's Family Code § 4058(a),
which provides, in pertinent part: "The annual gross income of each parent means
income from whatever source derived... and includes, but is not limited to, the
following: (1) Income such as ... interest; ... (3) In the discretion of the court ...
any corresponding reduction in living expenses, and other relevant facts." Id. at
878 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(a) (West 1994)).
74. Id. at 878, 880.
75. Id. at 882, 884 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(f) (West 1994) and
referring to CAL. FAM. CODE § 4056(a)(3) (West 1994)).
76. Id. at 822, 884-85. The Kern court differentiated cases where the child is
being supported by AFDC benefits and the obligor's actual income is insufficient
to provide the minimum basic standard, stating that in such cases the trial court
would have to consider the inheritance received by the obligor in determining
child support. Id. at 880. See also County of Riverside v. Nevitt, 104 Cal Rptr. 2d
278 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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have done so only because of special circumstances, such as past
child support calculations or different statutory definitions of
income. The policy concerns referred to by the Humphreys dissent
demand that Pennsylvania join the majority of jurisdictions on this
issue."
C. Policy Considerations
First, both the dissent and the majority opinions in Humphreys
agreed that the underlying goal of the support guidelines is to
ensure "persons similarly situated shall be treated similarly."78
However, the position advocated by the majority treated inheritors
of cash differently from inheritors of property arbitrarily, without
any valid distinction.79 Under the majority's decision, had Mr.
DeRoss chosen to inherit his mother's house and held on to it a few
more months until his daughter turned 18, rather than selling it and
receiving the cash immediately, the outcome would have been
completely opposite. As the dissent pointed out, "[tihis disparate
treatment is not logical, and leads to unfairness and absurd
results."'
The majority cites Depp v. Holland for the proposition that the
purpose of child support is to promote the child's best interests.8'
However, including cash inheritance as income for child support
calculation purposes will ultimately result in being detrimental to
the interest of the child. By spreading the cash inheritance out over
the remaining support period, the court assumes that the heir is
going to consume the entire amount of the inheritance within that
time. Forcing the heir to use the inheritance would prevent the
obligor parent from saving or investing the money, such as putting
it into a college fund for the child. This is hardly in the best
interests of the child.
Heirs will circumvent this increase in their child support
obligations by choosing to inherit property rather than cash, or by
delaying settlement of the estate until after the child support period
is completed.82 Children will get nothing, rather than sharing in the
parent's increased wealth if the circumstances so warrant.
77. See Humphreys v. DeRoss, 737 A.2d 775, 785-86 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en
banc), allocatur granted, 729 A.2d 371 (Pa. 2000).
78. Id. at 777, 785 (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322(a) (West 1991)).
79. Id. at 785.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 777 (citing Depp v. Holland, 636 A.2d 204, 205-06 (Pa. Super. 1994).
82. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 786.
[Vol. 105:2
FORCING THE HEIR TO SHARE
Also, if a child support obligation automatically increases due
to a cash inheritance received by the obligor parent, then the
converse must be true when the custodial parent or the child
himself inherits. That is, when the custodial parent or child inherits,
the child support obligation must automatically decrease. 83 It is
difficult to discern how this would be in the "best interests of the
child."
The dissent also noted with concern the situation of where an
heir elects to take his or her inheritance in kind rather than
receiving money, or chooses to renounce the cash inheritance
altogether.' Would the court consider such an action to be a
renouncement of "income," and therefore impute income to the
obligor anyway? 5 While this solution might make sense if the
obligor's choice is based solely on the avoidance of increased child
support, there are many other reasons for such a decision, such as
the desire to keep land or an heirloom in the family, or wanting a
larger portion of the cash inheritance to go to a more needy
sibling.' 6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "in
interpreting statutes, it is axiomatic that the legislature does not
intend an absurd or unreasonable result. 87  The Humphreys
majority opinion interpreted the income definition contained in 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 in such as way as to cause an absurd and
unreasonable result. By including the entire body of the
inheritance in the income calculation, the court more than
quadrupled defendant's monthly income because there was only a
year-and-a-half remaining of the child support period. If the
defendant had inherited the same amount when his child was a
toddler, the effect would be less; while if he had inherited the sum
during the last month of the obligation, the impact would be
enormous and even more ridiculous than the current result. Such
an arbitrary outcome cannot be described as anything less than
"absurd and unreasonable."
An heir whose child support obligation has increased due to
the receipt of an inheritance may also have a constitutional





87. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 785-86 (citing Commonwealth v. Beachey, 728
A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. 1999)).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
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Humphreys majority states that a child support order may not be
punitive or confiscatory.89 However, the majority's decision to
include cash inheritance as income in calculating a child support
obligation could indeed be seen as confiscatory in that it
automatically forces an heir to share his or her gift of inheritance,
without regard to the obligor's resources or the child's needs.
By overriding the intent of the decedent as expressed in the
will, i.e. that the inheritance should go to a specified person, the
court is essentially taking the place of the legislature in altering the
testate statutes. As the dissent points out, "Parents of children with
support orders (or parents who worry their children may one day
have an order) must change their wills, or face their legacy being
passed through the ex-spouse of their child in the name of support.
No grandparent wants to leave their worldly goods to the domestic
relations office." °
D. Pennsylvania's Deviation Procedure
The Humphreys majority opinion quotes 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
4322(a), which states that "[i]n determining the ... ability of the
obligor to provide support, the guideline shall place primary
emphasis on the net incomes and earning capacities of the parties,
with allowable deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses
and other factors, such as the parties' assets, as warrant special
attention."9' It is curious that although the majority chose to
emphasize the deviation portion of the statute, they then proceeded
to include cash inheritance as income in the regular guideline
procedure, completely ignoring possibility of utilizing the deviation
property, without due process of law ...."); see Sue Nations, Family Law
Symposium: Louisiana Child Support Guidelines: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 LA.
L. REV. 1057, 1067 (1990).
There may even be a basis for a constitutional challenge to the inclusion
of inheritances in the broad category of gifts if it can be established that
the child support guidelines require divorced couples to pass an
inheritance along to their minor children in the form of increased child
support payments even when the children are already being maintained
at a comfortable financial level. Married couples have no such obligation
to share this new-found wealth with their children so long as the children
are well enough provided for that a claim of criminal neglect of the family
would not lie.
Id.
89. Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 779 (citing Opie v. Richart, 598 A.2d 1321, 1322
(Pa. Super. 1991)).
90. Id. at 786.
91. Id. at 777 (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322(a) (West 1991)
(emphasis added by Humphreys majority).
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procedure. This deviation procedure, advocated by the dissent,
provides the best way for a court to take a cash inheritance into
account when calculating a child support obligation.92
In 1989, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the support
guidelines found at Pa. R.C.P. 1910.16-1 et seq.93 The intent of the
guidelines was to do away with individual, case-by-case determin-
ations of what constitutes the reasonable needs and expenses of the
parties involved, and thus to limit the trial court's discretion.94
There is a rebuttable presumption for all cases that fall within
the guidelines (combined monthly income of $15,000 or less) that
the amount of the award which would result from the application of
the child support guideline is the correct amount of support to be
awarded.95 However, the trier of fact may deviate from the
guidelines where the facts demonstrate that the award is
inappropriate.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has limited the
use of the deviation procedure to cases where "special needs and/or
circumstances are present such as to render an award in the amount
of the guideline figure unjust or inappropriate. 97
The deviation procedure is contained in Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 1910.16-5. 9' Section (b) of this statute sets out nine
factors that the court can take into consideration in deciding
whether to deviate from the amount of support determined by the
guidelines. 9 Two of these factors are particularly applicable to the
Humphreys case: (5) assets of the parties; and (9) other relevant
92. See id. at 784, 786-87.
93. Ball v. Minnick, 648 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Pa. 1994).
94. Id. at 1197.
95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322(b) (West 1991); Ball, 648 A.2d at 1196.
96. Ball, 648 A.2d at 1196.
97. Id.
98. 231 PA. CODE. § 1910.16-5 (2001).
99. Id.
In deciding whether to deviate from the amount of support determined by the
guidelines, the trier of fact shall consider:
(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligations;
(2) other support obligations of the parties;
(3) other income in the household;
(4) ages of the children;
(5) assets of the parties;
(6) medical expenses not covered by insurance;
(7) standard of living of the parties and their children;
(8) in a spousal support or alimony pendente lite case, the period of time
during which the parties lived together from the date of marriage to the
date of final separation; and
(9) other relevant and appropriate factors, including the best interests of the
child or children.
231 PA. CODE. § 1910.16-5(b) (2001).
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and appropriate factors, including the best interests of the child or
children.'" While the Supreme Court seems to discourage use of
the deviation procedure in Ball v. Minnick, this can largely be
attributed to the fact that the trial court had used the deviation
procedure to decrease the amount of support, rather than increase
it101it. 
°
Pennsylvania's deviation procedure is perfectly suited to the
task of taking the obligor's cash inheritance into account as an asset
and adjusting the child support obligation accordingly. By
addressing the inheritance in a deviation procedure, the court is
able to be more flexible and take individual circumstances into
account, such as the child's needs and the obligor's ability to pay.
This alternative would avoid the absurd results brought about by
the Humphreys majority's decision to automatically include the
cash inheritance as income. An heir's child support obligation
would not spike to an unreasonable level upon receiving a cash
inheritance just before the child turns eighteen; an inheritor of cash
would not arbitrarily be treated differently than an inheritor of
property; the testator's wishes would be recognized; and, most
importantly, the child's bests interests would be protected.
IV. Conclusion
Cash inheritance should not automatically be included as
income when calculating child support obligations. As other
jurisdictions have done, Pennsylvania should either impute income
to cash inheritance, rather than use the corpus itself, or consider the
entire inheritance in deviation proceedings after the child support
obligation has been calculated according to the guidelines. Using
either of these methods would be consistent with the stated purpose
of child support (to provide for the best interests of the child),
would be in line with decisions of other jurisdictions, and would
allow the flexibility needed to avoid the policy problems caused by
the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Humphreys v.
DeRoss.
Elizabeth Zarek Jorgenson
100. Id.; Humphreys, 737 A.2d at 787.
101. See Ball. 648 A.2d at 1194.
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